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A. COURT DECISIONS 
§13.1. Electric companies: Rates. Metropolitan District Commis-
sion v. Department of Public Utilities1 consisted of three companion 
cases which had their origin in complaints filed by the Metropolitan 
District Commission. The Commission alleged that it had been over-
charged for street lighting by the Boston Edison Company, the Massa-
chusetts Electric Company, and the Cambridge Electric Light Com-
pany. The complaint in each case was that the then existing street 
lighting rate of each company provided that lines, poles, luminaires 
and other facilities necessary for street lighting would be supplied by 
the company. In practice, however, the Commission had supplied a 
substantial portion of the equipment used for street lighting on streets 
subject to its control. In each case the Department held that a special 
new rate should be adopted by the company, based on its regular 
street lighting rate reduced by the amount the company saved by 
avoiding the fixed charges which it would have incurred if it had 
owned all of the equipment.2 
In determining the amount by which the company's rates should be 
reduced, the Department had to consider the question of the extent to 
which the Commission's contribution of equipment reduced the com-
pany's costs. Not all of the equipment owned by the M.D.C. necessarily 
represented a saving to the company. Many of the streets involved 
were served by means of underground lines installed at the request of 
the M.D.C. There was no evidence that the company would have been 
required to provide lighting via an underground installation if the 
Commission had not contributed some of the underground facilities. 
If the company had been obligated to serve only by means of over-
head facilities, the contribution of some of the underground facilities 
by the M.D.C. represented a saving to the company only to the extent 
that the costs incurred by the company in connection with the under-
ground facilities supplied by it was less than the company would have 
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§13.1. 11967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 245, 224 N.E.2d 502. 
2 Massachusetts Electric Co., D.P.U. 14133 Oune, 1965); Boston Edison Co., D.P.U. 
14132 (Sept., 1964), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.6; Cambridge Electric 
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incurred if it were allowed to provide the street lights by means of 
overhead facilities. 
The Department held that the M.D.C. had the burden of proving 
that its ownership of certain underground facilities represented a sav-
ing to the company. In the absence of evidence on the issue, no al-
lowance in the rate should be made because of Commission owner-
ship of these facilities. This holding followed the Department's 
customary procedure in rate matters.3 If a company is proposing a 
new rate, it has the burden of showing that it is proper. If an existing 
rate of a company is called into question, the complaining party has 
the burden of demonstrating its impropriety. Any other rule would 
result in repeated rate cases initiated by customers imposing on the 
company the costly burden of preparing full rate cases. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in affirming the Department on this 
issue, pointed out that the Department's rule is consistent with the 
general rule regarding burden of proof, namely, that the moving party 
must prove its case. The Court noted that although the Department 
instituted the proceedings on its own motion, they were initiated on 
the request of the Commission. The language suggests that if proceed-
ings were instituted on the Department's own motion without prior 
complaint, the burden of proof might have been different. A basis for 
distinction might be that the Department ought to be able to initiate 
rate proceedings whenever it deemed it necessary and could be relied 
on not to harass companies subject to its jurisdiction. On the other 
hand, such a rule would be a departure from the general rule that 
the moving party has the burden of proof and might result in some 
difficulty in determining a proper rate, if a company failed in estab-
lishing the burden of proving that an existing rate were reasonable. 
The M.D.C. also sought a ruling of the Department that it had 
been "overcharged" prior to the filing of the new rates ordered by 
the Department in these proceedings. The Department declined to 
make any finding on this issue on the basis that it had no power to 
order reparations and that, accordingly, there was no reason to make 
any findings. The Court reversed the Department on this holding, 
stating that although the Department had no power to award repara-
tions, a customer may be entitled to recover at law if it could establish 
an improper charge. In the Court's view, the Department would be 
the appropriate tribunal for the determination of the proper rate that 
should have been applied. Moreover, General Laws, Chapter 164, 
Section 78, obligates the Department to report deviations from the law 
by any company to the Attorney General. The Court's reference to 
this Section implies that if it comes to the attention of the Department 
that a charge in the past has been improper, it has a duty to investi-
gate and make findings concerning the charge, even though no remedy 
may be available. 
The question of improper charges may be raised in several con-
3 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.8. 
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texts: (1) while the charge to the customer may have been consistent 
with a rate filed with the Department, it is alleged that the filed rate 
is improper in the sense that it is unduly high in terms of the cost 
of the services offered; (2) while the customer may have been charged 
in accordance with a filed rate, it is alleged that the customer is en-
titled, under the terms of another filed rate, to a lower charge; or 
(3) the customer may have been charged under the terms of a filed rate 
which it is alleged did not properly cover him, but there is no other 
filed rate of the company that is applicable to the customer. It is 
clear that the Commission could not recover reparations from the elec-
tric company under the terms of the first two of the above categories. 
As to the first category, the Supreme Judicial Court specifically re-
jected the possibility of recovery in that situation. A rule which would 
permit a retroactive attack on rates which have been filed and ap-
proved by the Department would impose grave problems in the field 
of regulation. A company, in formulating its financial plans, must be 
able to rely on retaining revenues produced by the proper application 
of its field rates. Therefore, the Commission could not seek reparation 
on the basis that the approved rate was improper. Instead, the Com-
mission would have to allege that the approved rate was inapplicable 
to it. 
In the context of the second situation, described above, it would 
appear that reparation could be made, but that this situation is in-
applicable to the facts of the present case. While the rate charged the 
Commission was inapplicable, in that it required the company to pro-
vide more service - in terms of providing equipment - than it did, 
the Court found that "it does not appear that any filed rate precisely 
fits the services rendered."4 
Thus, the Commission's case fits into the third situation described 
above - where the rate charged is inapplicable to the situation. The 
Court held that the Department must decide "whether the service 
actually rendered to the commission differed so radically" from the 
service required under the filed rate "that one of the other rates on 
file with the department is more applicable to the service rendered."5 
In short, the Department must determine which rate of the company 
comes closest to describing the service actually received by the Com-
mission. 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 
§13.2. Water companies: Rates. It has been common in the proof 
offered by companies in support of proposed rate increases to select 
the last full year of operations as the "test" year. The demonstration 
of the need for proposed revenue increases is then based on the actual 
operating revenues and expenses of the test year, adjusting the various 
items on the basis of known changes that have transpired during or 
41967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 254-255, 224 N.E.2d at 509. 
1\ Id. at 255,224 N.E.2d at 509. 
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since the test year prior to the public hearing. In Milford Water Co.,t 
the company sought to adjust upward the rate base of the test year 
by adding a projected increase in plant investment, arguing that the 
additional plant investment would not be income producing, but was 
required merely to improve the quality and pressure of water to exist-
ing customers. The Department rejected this approach stating: 
Sound rate regulation requires that, with few carefully limited 
exceptions, existing investment and actual operating results, 
which are objectively verifiable, must be the basis of justification 
for rate increases rather than predictions as to the future.2 
The Department did permit, as it had in similar cases where it ap-
peared that increased investment clearly would not be offset by a 
proportionate increase in net operating income, the use of a year-end 
rate base rather than an average rate base for the test year. 
§13.3. Transportation agencies: Jurisdiction. General Laws, 
Chapter 161A, which governs the operation of the Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority, established guidelines for the division of 
authority between the M.KT.A. and the Department of Public Utili-
ties. Section 3(i) authorizes the M.KT.A. to "provide mass trans-
portation service ... in the area constituting the authority and with-
out being subject to the jurisdiction and control of the department 
of public utilities in any matter except as to safety of equipment and 
operations .... " Section 5(k) provides that any "private company 
lawfully providing mass transportation service in the area constituting 
the authority ... may conduct such further operations as the authority 
may permit in the future provided that the authority shall in all 
respects have the same powers and duties in respect to such private 
carriers as are provided by law for the department of public utilities, 
except as to safety of equipment and operations." Section 22 provides 
that in the event of "any conflict between the regulatory powers and 
duties of the department of public utilities and the regulatory powers 
and duties of the authority within its area, the department of public 
utilities shall resolve such dispute and exercise such powers as it 
deems required in the particular instance." 
It seems clear that where a private carrier operates within the area 
constituting the Authority and has no operations outside of the 
Authority, the Department of Public Utilities has no jurisdiction un-
der Chapter 159A to regulate the operations of that carrier, except 
with respect to safety. The statute appears to require that the 
M.B.T.A. operate as the regulatory agency to dispose of such matters 
as rates and routes of these carriers, applying the provisions of Chap-
ter 159A. Confusion exists, however, with respect to the roles to be 
played by the M.B.T.A. and the Department of Public Utilities in con-
nection with carriers who have operations both within and without 
§111.2. 1 D.P.U. 15110 (Sept., 1966). 
2Id. 
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the area. The different activities of these carriers, in varying degrees, 
affect both parts of their operations. For example, operation over a 
route, one terminal of which is outside the area and the other inside 
the area, may affect transportation between points both of which are 
outside the area, points both of which are inside the area, and points 
one of which is outside and one inside the area. Moreover, a route 
which is economical to operate from a point outside the area to a 
point inside the area, may be uneconomic if the portion of the route 
outside the area or the portion of the route inside the area is elim-
inated. Similar considerations may apply to rates. 
Purporting to act under the provisions of Section 22 of Chapter 
161A, the Department promulgated a general guideline for the treat-
ment of these matters.l It stated that it would not exercise any power 
(except with respect to safety) over carriers, none of the operations of 
which were outside the area. With respect to carriers that had a route 
between a point outside of the area and a point inside the area, or a 
route outside the area and a route inside the area, it required that all 
petitions and filing would be made both with the M.B.T.A. and the 
Department. The Department then would exercise exclusive jurisdic-
tion over these matters, unless it determined that the M.B.T.A. should 
exercise jurisdiction in any particular case. 
Nevertheless, the agencies have not been able to agree on the appro-
priate handling of these matters. In many instances duplicate hearings 
are being held on the same issue. In New York Central R.R.2 the rail-
road sought to discontinue the operation of certain trains operating 
between Framingham and Boston and certain other trains operating 
between Worcester and Boston with stops at Framingham and other 
intermediate points between Framingham and Boston. In its petition 
before the Department, the railroad requested authority to discon-
tinue the operations of the Worcester to Boston trains between Fram-
ingham and Worcester. It did not submit the Framingham to Boston 
trains or the portion of the Worcester to Boston trains, between 
Framingham and Boston, to the jurisdiction of the Department. The 
Department, finding that the operation of all of these trains consti-
tuted an integrated commuter service, determined that it should pass 
upon the entire operation in determining whether any of the services 
could be eliminated and, after the hearing, dismissed the petition of the 
railroad to discontinue the service between Framingham and Worces-
ter and ordered the railroad to continue the operation of the service 
between Framingham and Boston. Had the M.B.T.A. made an incon-
sistent determination, a specific conflict would have arisen, requiring 
resolution before an appropriate tribunal. However, the M.B.T.A. 
made no decision on the matter, which, under the Transportation Act 
"Of 1958, is tantamount to denial.s 
§I!1.!I. 1 D.P.U. 15377·E (March, 1967). 
2 D.P.U. 15474 (August, 1967). 
S 49 U.S.C. §13a(2) (1964). 
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The Attorney General has rendered an opinion that in a situation 
such as was presented in the New York Central R.R. case, the Depart-
ment should have authority over the trains operating between Boston 
and Worcester, including portions of the operation between Framing-
ham and Boston, but that it should have no jurisdiction over the 
trains operating between Framingham and Boston.4 His opinion recog-
nized that the jurisdiction of the Department must extend to certain 
portions of public transportation within the area where the two are 
inextricably connected, as in the case of one train from a point out-
side the area to a point within, but does not take account of some 
important economic facts of commuter travel. 
Clearly, the legislation creating the M.B.T.A. gave it regulatory 
powers over carriers within the area as an adjunct to its principal 
functions, which are to plan, operate and finance mass transportation 
within its area. The General Court intended that the Authority's 
plans for the area ought not to be frustrated by its inability to obtain 
regulation authorization of changes in routes and rates which the plans 
required. On the other hand, the legislature also recognized that in-
terests of people within the area might not always coincide with those 
of people outside. and Section 22 prescribes a means of resolving 
these conflicts. The New York Central R.R. case presents a good illus-
tration of a situation where the interests of people outside the area 
depend on decisions relating to transportation within the area, be-
cause it would not be economically feasible to operate a train between 
Boston and Worcester which made no intermediate stops. By picking 
up and discharging passengers in the congested area between Framing-
ham and Boston, the Worcester passengers can be carried at a much 
lower cost. It is important. therefore, that consistent decisions should 
be made concerning the Framingham to Boston and the Framingham 
to Worcester portions of the run. The opinion of the Attorney General 
recognized this. 
The opinion fails to take into account the integrated nature of the 
entire Boston-Framingham-Worcester service. Most commuters who 
travel into Boston on a morning train, return from Boston on an 
evening train. One of the most important factors in a commuter 
service is frequency of operation. Patronage tends to decline as the 
frequency of service declines. If an evening train is discontinued, in-
variably the morning trains will suffer a decline of patronage, because 
there will be some commuters who will not commute at all due to the 
inconvenience of the remaining nighttime service. Thus, it can be 
seen that the elimination of a Framingham to Boston train will have 
consequences on a Boston to Worcester train, because some of those 
passengers travelling on the Framingham to Boston train will have 
ordinarily used the Boston to Framingham portion of a Boston to 
Worcester train and will cease commuting because the outgoing service 
is no longer convenient for him. From a railroad economics point of 
4 Opinion dated June, 1967, in reply to Department of Public Utilities. 
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view, there is no question that a service should be considered as a 
whole for purposes of determining whether portions of it may be dis-
continued, and it would seem that Section 22 of Chapter 16lA was 
included in the act establishing the M.B.T.A. in order that the De-
partment of Public Utilities could act in this capacity. 
§13.4. Gas and electric companies: Accounting practices. In 
D.P.U. 15364, the Department instituted an investigation, still under 
way, into the proper accounting for promotional practices which have 
been increasingly used by gas and electric companies in recent years. 
These practices may take the form of rental of gas or electric ap-
pliances, installing gas or electric equipment (such as air conditioning) 
on customers' premises and continuing to own the equipment, or pur-
chase of electric entrance switches, among other practices. The outcome 
of the accounting investigation will have a bearing on future security 
issues of the companies involved, since the Department customarily 
ascertains, before approving the issuance of any securities, that the 
securities will be balanced by an equivalent amount of capitalizable 
additions. During the period of the investigation, the Department has 
approved the issuance of securities, but has made its findings of 
capitalizable additions tentative and subject to revision, depending on 
the outcome of the investigation.1 
§13.5. Railroad transportation agencies: Safety. In two compan-
ion cases, the Department dealt with the distinction between recon-
struction and alteration of a bridge.1 The West 4th Street Bridge in 
the city of Boston consists of six spans. The superstructure, subfloor-
ing, and pavement over the sub flooring of span number six was 
destroyed by fire, although the abutments for the spans were not 
destroyed. The city of Boston applied to the Department under the 
provisions of Section 84 of Chapter 159 of the General Laws for an 
order compelling the railroad to repair the bridge. The railroad 
brought a petition under Section 59 of Chapter 159 for authority to 
alter the bridge and submitted plans for a new and improved bridge 
span. The granting of the city's petition would have resulted in the 
railroad bearing the full cost. However, if the railroad petition were 
granted, a portion of the cost would have been borne by the city. In 
Boston and Albany R.R. v. Department of Public Utilities,2 the Su-
preme Judicial Court described the difference as follows: "A structural 
change or renewal for the purpose of extending or improving the 
bridge differs from a restoration of the structure to its original sound 
condition."3 The city represented that it would be content with a 
restoration of the bridge to conform as nearly as possible to the orig-
§13.4. 1 Buzzards Bay Gas Co., D.P.U. 15383 (July, 1967); Lowell Gas Co., D.P.U. 
15382 (July, 1967); New Bedford Gas and Edison Light Co., D.P.U. 15421 (Feb., 
1967); Brockton-Taunton Gas Co., D.P.U. 15374 (Dec., 1966). 
§13.5. 1 Trustees of the New York, New Haven and Hartford R.R., D.P.U. 15457 
(May, 1967); City Council of Boston, D.P.U. 15406 (May, 1967). 
2314 Mass. 634, 51 N.E.2d 445 (1943). 
3Id. at 641, 51 N.E.2d at 449. 
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inal plans. Since the city is primarily responsible for the control of 
traffic over the railroad, the Department found that the railroad's plan 
to build an improved structure was not required and that accordingly 
"repair" of the bridge would be sufficient. 
c. LEGISLATION 
§13.6. Commercial motor vehicles: Rates. Section 6 of Chapter 
15gB of the General Laws has been amended by adding, in part, the 
following: "The Department shall annually establish reasonable maxi-
mum and minimum rates or charges consistent with industry and eco-
nomic conditions and consistent with the declaration of policy con-
tained in section one."1 The Department, in the case of a few small 
selected segments of the motor carrier industry, where special condi-
tions indicate its propriety, has established minimum rates.2 The 
amendment, apparently adopted at the request of the dump truck 
segment of the industry, not only requires that these minimums be 
established annually, but also requires that maximums be established. 
No petition has ever been presented to the Department requesting the 
establishment of a maximum rate. Indeed, the history of the dump 
truck portion of the industry demonstrates quite clearly the lack of 
necessity for the establishment of maximum rates. The statute will re-
quire a good deal of wasted effort by the Department, both in the 
establishment of an unnecessary maximum, and also in establishing 
annual minimum rates, since the practice will doubtless be to con-
tinue existing minimum rates, until the necessity for a change is 
demonstrated. 
The greatest vice of the statute, however, is that it covers the entire 
commercial motor vehicle industry, by far the greatest portion of which 
operates without minimum or maximum rates, for which no need has 
ever been demonstrated, and for the adoption of which no request has 
ever been made to the Department. There are literally thousands of 
commercial motor vehicle carriers, each with any number of differ-
ent rates, depending on the commodity, the points of origin, the 
points of destination, the special needs of a particular shipper, as well 
as other factors bearing on the propriety of rates. The statute appears 
to be without precedent anywhere, and presents difficulties of admin-
istration that are virtually impossible to handle. 
§13.7. Commercial motor vehicles: Hearings. Section 21 of Chap-
ter 15gB of the General Laws has been amended by requiring the De-
partment to dispose of complaints in fourteen days, if a hearing is 
not necessary, and in ninety days after the close of hearings, if a hear-
ing is necessary.1 The hearing, if necessary, must be completed within 
§13.6. I Acts of 1967, c. 516. 
2 New England Motor Rate Bureau, D.P.U. 12778 (April, 1959); Dump Truck 
Owners Assoc., D.P.U. 10730 (April, 1955); see 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.7. 
§13.7. I Acts of 1967, c. 515. 
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twenty-one days after the order for hearings which must be issued 
within fourteen days after the complaint. 
§13.8. Common carriers of passengers by motor vehicle: Licenses. 
Section IIA of Chapter 159A has been amended by requiring that 
notices of hearings relating to charter licenses be given to the holders 
of licenses or certificates of public convenience and necessity in the 
municipality in which the proposed charter service is to be located or 
in contiguous municipalities.1 The amendment insures that notice 
will be given to all carriers who may have information concerning the 
public need for the service in the region in question. 
§13.8. 1 Acts of 1966, c. 531. 
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